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The participants in the 2014 Duke Law Journal Administrative
Law Symposium came to three important conclusions. First, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Treasury
(Treasury) have been systematically declining to act in accordance
with the duties imposed on them by the Administrative Procedure
1
Act (APA) for many decades. Second, courts should require the IRS
2
and Treasury to comply with the APA. Third, the Supreme Court has
signaled its intent to “take administrative law to tax”—as suggested
by the title of this symposium—by requiring the IRS and Treasury to
3
comply with the APA. I agree with Professor Steve Johnson that the
duty to explain why it has taken an action is one of the most
4
important duties that the APA imposes on the IRS and Treasury. I
am concerned, however, that the agencies that implement tax laws
lack the resources required to comply with the demands of the APA,
as those demands have been interpreted, expanded, and applied by
courts.
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1. See generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L.J.
1625 (2014) (examining scholarship that discusses whether, and to what degree, the reasonedexplanation requirement of the APA should apply to the IRS and Treasury).
2. Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771,
1773 (2014).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1774.
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INTRODUCTION
In Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, Professor
Johnson provides a valuable service by describing the nature of the
explanations that the IRS would likely be required to provide when it
5
issues decisions in many types of common tax disputes. Professor
Johnson estimates that the IRS makes between fifty thousand and
6
fifty million decisions in informal adjudications each year. If courts
begin to apply the APA arbitrary-and-capricious standard to IRS
decisions that resolve adjudicatory disputes, the IRS might believe
that it is required to provide an explanation of the type Professor
Johnson describes every time it adjudicates such tax disputes. If the
IRS were to attempt to provide a statement of reasons sufficient to
satisfy a reviewing court to support each of those decisions, its ability
to implement our system of taxation would be severely impaired. The
resources available to the IRS are nowhere near sufficient to satisfy
the judicially imposed version of the duty to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking in every case in which the IRS adjudicates a tax
dispute. Fortunately, the IRS has other much less burdensome
options it can take if courts begin to apply the APA to the IRS
decisions made in adjudications.
Professor Johnson offers the key to understanding the wide
range of options available to the IRS when he notes that all IRS
7
adjudications are informal adjudications under the APA. As he then
discusses, § 553 to § 558 of the APA do not require an agency to use
any decisionmaking procedures when it engages in informal
adjudication. The Supreme Court has held that only APA § 555
8
applies to informal adjudications. That section, appropriately titled
“Ancillary Matters,” does not require an agency to state reasons for
its actions except in the case of a decision to deny a written petition.
None of the common types of informal IRS adjudications described
by Professor Johnson qualify as denials of a written petition. Thus,
the IRS is not required to provide a statement of the reasons for any
action it takes in an adjudication. Furthermore, no court can hold that

5. Id.
6. In response to my question during the Symposium, Professor Johnson estimated that
the number of such adjudications would be between fifty thousand and fifty million. His article
describes the many contexts in which the IRS engages in informal adjudication. Johnson, supra
note 2, at 1793–1833.
7. Id. at 1779.
8. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990).
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the IRS has committed a procedural error by refusing to provide such
a statement. If a taxpayer seeks judicial review of an action the IRS
has taken in an adjudication, arguing that the action is an arbitraryand-capricious violation of APA § 706, a court can require the IRS to
provide a statement of its reasons for acting as it did. As a result, the
court would have a basis to apply the arbitrary-and-capricious test
even if the agency did not provide a contemporaneous statement of
reasons adequate to allow a court to apply the arbitrary-and9
capricious test to the agency action.
It follows that the IRS could pursue a range of options in
adjudications. First, the IRS might provide no contemporaneous
statement of reasons for any action and be prepared to provide such a
statement only if the action is the subject of a review petition. Second,
the IRS could provide only a brief contemporaneous statement of
reasons for each action and be prepared to provide a more detailed
statement if and when a review petition is filed. Finally, the IRS could
provide a contemporaneous statement of reasons only for actions that
it expects will be subject to a review petition, but be prepared to
provide such a statement in any other case that is the subject of a
review petition. Given the range of available options—and the
relatively small number of actions taken by the IRS in adjudications
likely to be subject to review petitions—I suspect that the IRS would
find a way to comply with the APA in this context. This method of
compliance would likely avoid stretching the IRS’s scarce resources
beyond the breaking point should courts begin to apply the APA to
actions it takes in adjudications.
I am much more concerned about the potential results of judicial
applications of the APA to tax rules issued by the IRS and Treasury.
In a 2007 article, Professor Kristin Hickman argued persuasively that
the IRS and Treasury issue an average of thirty-two tax rules per year
that the agencies fail to subject to the notice-and-comment procedure
10
described in APA § 553. I agree that the IRS should use the noticeand-comment procedure to issue those rules but also recognize that
the procedure consumes a lot of time and agency resources. For
instance, Professors Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa

9. See id. at 645–47, 653–56 (describing and explaining this process).
10. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1748 (2007) (finding ninety-five rulemaking projects over a three-year period that
did not follow traditional APA procedures).
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Peters found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
required approximately 5.5 years to issue each of ninety rules
11
implementing the Air Toxic Emission Standards. Most of the rules
Wagner, Barnes, and Peters studied were not economically significant
rules, that is, rules that are expected to have an annual effect on the
12
economy of at least $100 million. Many other studies have found
that issuance of a rule through use of the notice-and-comment process
takes much longer and requires a much greater commitment of
agency resources if the rule is economically significant. For instance,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s)
passive restraint rule required almost twenty years to issue and
consumed such a high proportion of NHTSA’s resources that the
agency largely abandoned rulemaking as a means of implementing its
13
highway safety mission. Similarly, despite devoting significant
resources to interstate pollution transport rulemaking for more than
two decades, the EPA has still not been able to issue an interstate
14
pollution transport rule that can satisfy the courts.
The time- and resource-consuming effects of the notice-andcomment procedure are often described under the heading of
15
rulemaking ossification. Ossification has many adverse effects,
including: delay in issuing important rules; failure to issue important
rules; diversion of scarce agency resources from other important
tasks; substitution of inferior methods of implementing a statutory
mission; and failure to amend or to rescind rules for many years after

11. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An
Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 143–45 (2011)
(noting that the EPA begins requesting technical information an average of four years before
the publication of the proposed rule and produces a final rule about 1.5 years after publication
of the proposed rule).
12. Id. at 145; see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (1993), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. (2012) (including in the definition of “significant regulatory
action” a regulatory action that will “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more”);
OFFICE
OF
MGMT.
&
BUDGET,
CIRCULAR
A-4
(2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 (classifying “significant regulatory actions as
defined by section 3(f)(1)” of Executive Order 12866 as “economically significant”).
13. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 207–
16 (1990) (discussing NHTSA’s struggles with the rulemaking process).
14. The D.C. Circuit described the lengthy history of this rulemaking in EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 24 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
15. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012) (noting that rule ossification
“mean[s] that it takes a long time and an extensive commitment of agency resources to use the
notice and comment process [of the APA] to issue a rule”).
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16

they have become obsolete. If the IRS and Treasury are required to
use the notice-and-comment process to issue thirty-two more tax rules
each year, they will experience all of the adverse effects of ossification
unless Congress significantly increases the two agencies’ budgets and
personnel. That seems highly unlikely to happen in the foreseeable
future given current budgetary and political constraints.
Some of the adverse effects of requiring the IRS and Treasury to
comply with the APA are unavoidable. However, certain adverse
effects may be worth tolerating in order to obtain the advantages of
the notice-and-comment procedure. One step that might reduce the
costs of compliance with the APA significantly would be to create a
situation in which the benefits of the notice-and-comment procedure
are not overwhelmed by the costs of the procedure. For example,
Congress might eliminate judicial review of the notice-and-comment
process. In the tax context, that step can be accomplished easily in a
manner that is consistent with existing statutes and precedents.
This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I describe the ways
in which courts have added burdensome procedures that are not
required by the APA for the notice and comment process. In Part II,
I explain why the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) is better than courts at reviewing the adequacy of agency
reasons for issuing a rule. In Part III, I explain how courts can
eliminate judicial review of the adequacy of the reasons IRS gives for
issuing a rule by applying the traditional broad interpretations of the
Anti-Injunction Act and the tax exception to the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
I. COURTS HAVE REDEFINED THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
It is easy to trace the path that has led to ossification of the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. APA § 553 requires an
17
agency to use a three-step process when it issues a rule. It must issue
a notice of proposed rulemaking, solicit comments from the public in
response to the notice, and issue a final rule that incorporates a
concise general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule. The
APA describes the three steps in the following language:

16. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
59, 60–62 (1995).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the
Federal Register . . . . The notice shall include—
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.
....
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
18
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.

Until 1967, agencies complied with APA § 553 as that provision
was written. In a typical rulemaking, the agency issued a relatively
brief notice that complied with § 553(b), received and considered
comments that were modest in length, and then issued a final rule
that incorporated a “concise general statement of basis and
19
20
purpose” only a few pages long.
The agency practice of compliance with APA § 553 as it was
written ended as a result of a series of court opinions that were issued
between 1967 and 1973. Those opinions changed the meaning of § 553
in ways that render it unrecognizable when compared with the
language of § 553.
The Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion in Abbott Laboratories v.
21
Gardner opened the door to a series of lower-court opinions that
“interpreted” § 553 to mean something dramatically different from
the simple and efficient decisionmaking process described in the
APA. In Abbott, the Court announced a new test for determining
whether a rule is ripe for pre-enforcement review. The Court applied
for the first time a presumption of reviewability so strong that it

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Jack M. Beerman & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 856, 892 (2007).
21. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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22

trumped the language of statutes. Like most regulatory statutes, the
statute at issue in Abbott explicitly provided a means through which a
party could seek review of a rule—by challenging its validity in an
enforcement proceeding initiated by the agency against the party. The
statute did not authorize a court to engage in pre-enforcement of a
rule. The Court applied the new presumption of reviewability to
reverse the normal process for determining whether Congress has
authorized a court to act. Instead of asking whether Congress
authorized pre-enforcement review, the Court asked whether there
was “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to
23
preclude pre-enforcement review. The Court concluded that the
presence of a statutory provision that authorized review of a rule in
an enforcement proceeding and the absence of a statutory provision
that authorized pre-enforcement review of a rule were not enough to
satisfy the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard that the Court
announced to accompany its newly announced presumption in favor
of pre-enforcement review of rules. Before Abbott, most rules were
subject to review only in enforcement proceedings. After Abbott, a
rule is subject to pre-enforcement review if, like most rules, it
presents a legal issue that is “fit for judicial resolution” and “requires
an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their
24
affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance.”
The stark differences between the review of a rule in an
enforcement proceeding authorized by Congress and the preenforcement review of a rule authorized by the Court became
apparent within a few years after the Court issued its opinion in
Abbott. In the context of an enforcement proceeding, a district court
would be tasked with reviewing the rule based on the enforcement
proceeding records. Since agencies usually only initiated enforcement
proceedings when a target had engaged in conduct that was
particularly egregious and obviously harmful, the record in such
proceedings frequently included evidence that the rule was necessary
to prevent serious harm. As a result, in cases in which the target
sought review of a rule, the agency was likely to prevail. Rules were
rarely challenged because a regulated firm knew that it was unlikely
22. Id. at 140; see generally Nicolas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2014) (discussing the tendency of the courts to invoke the
presumption of judicial review when reviewing agency actions despite statutory language that
appears to preclude judicial review).
23. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141.
24. Id. at 153.
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to prevail when it attempted to challenge the validity of the rule in an
enforcement proceeding. The firm also knew that it was vulnerable to
serious direct and indirect adverse consequences if it violated the rule
or challenged the validity of the rule in an enforcement proceeding
and lost.
By contrast, any firm that dislikes a rule has an incentive to seek
pre-enforcement review of the rule because it will suffer no adverse
effects if it loses. Within a few years, it became apparent that a
regulated firm also has a much better chance of prevailing in a
proceeding in which it seeks pre-enforcement review of a rule than
when it challenges the validity of the same rule in a proceeding to
enforce it. In most cases, pre-enforcement review takes place in a
circuit court rather than a district court. The circuit court has an
understandable desire to have access to some kind of record that it
can use as the basis for review. It does not have access to the record
of an enforcement proceeding for that purpose, so it uses a “record”
that consists of the notice, the comments filed in response to the
notice, and the “concise general statement” of the rule’s basis and
25
purpose that the agency is required to incorporate in the final rule.
26
In Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, one of the
first pre-enforcement review cases decided after the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Abbott, the D.C. Circuit stated that it needed
access to a record sufficient to allow it to engage in pre-enforcement
27
review of a rule. The court then described the conflict between the
record that is created when an agency complies with APA § 553 and
the kind of record the court thought that it needed to engage in pre28
enforcement review of a rule. The court resolved that conflict by
instructing agencies to take the actions needed to develop the kind of
record the court considered necessary to allow it to engage in review
rather than to comply with the requirements Congress described in
APA § 553. In the court’s words:
[I]t is appropriate for us to remind the Administrator of the everpresent possibility of judicial review, and to caution against an
25. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
26. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27. See id. at 338 (“We do expect that, if the judicial review [required by Congress] is to be
meaningful, the ‘concise general statement[’] . . . will enable us to see what major issues of
policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it
did.”).
28. See id. (discussing “differences of emphasis and approach” to the record needed for a
rule making, as compared to appellate review).
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overly literal reading of the statutory terms “concise” and “general.”
These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judicial
scrutiny, which do not contemplate that the court itself will, by a
laborious examination of the record, formulate in the first instance
the significant issues faced by the agency and articulate the rationale
of their resolution. We do not expect the agency to discuss every
item of fact or opinion included in the submissions made to it in
informal rule making. We do expect that, if the judicial review which
Congress has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful,
the “concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose” mandated
by section 4 will enable us to see what major issues of policy were
ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted
29
to them as it did.

The court went on to hold that the three-page “concise general
statement of basis and purpose” that the agency had incorporated in
the rule was sufficient to allow the court to uphold the rule because
the petitioner did not file detailed and well-supported comments that
30
criticized the rule proposed in the notice.
The members of the Washington, D.C. Bar immediately
internalized and acted on the message the D.C. Circuit sent in
Automotive Parts. Lawyers for regulated firms that disliked a rule
proposed by an agency began to submit lengthy and detailed
comments that criticized the rule, often accompanied by consultants’
reports that purported to make findings that undermined the basis for
the rule. Thus, for instance, when the NHTSA proposed another rule
shortly after its “victory” in Automotive Parts, a trade association that
disliked the proposed rule submitted lengthy comments that criticized
31
in detail every aspect of the agency proposal. The comments were
accompanied by the reports of studies conducted by consulting firms
retained by the association that purported to find that the proposed
rule was unnecessary and that its implementation would be costly and
dangerous. The association prevailed in the pre-enforcement review
proceeding it initiated based on the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the
final rule was arbitrary and capricious because the agency had not
responded adequately to the comments filed by the association that
32
were critical of the proposed rule.
29.
30.
31.
1974).
32.

Id.
Id. at 338–41.
Nat’l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass’n, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 36–40 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 40–41.
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That pair of D.C. Circuit opinions created an entirely new legal
environment. Every circuit has followed the lead of the D.C. Circuit
in holding that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious unless the
agency responds adequately to all well-supported comments that are
critical of the rule proposed by the agency, and the Supreme Court’s
1983 opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm
33
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. has been widely interpreted to
34
approve of the D.C. Circuit approach. The Supreme Court also
added a seemingly open-ended duty to consider alternatives to any
action an agency proposes to take in a rulemaking. Not surprisingly,
those judicial opinions have created incentives for parties that dislike
proposed rules to bury an agency with comments that criticize the
proposed rule and suggest alternatives to the proposed rule.
Comments on economically significant proposed rules routinely are
tens of thousands of pages long and are regularly accompanied by
consultant studies that purport to undermine the bases for the
proposed rule. Agencies regularly require years to draft the severalhundred page “concise general statement of basis and purpose” that
must be incorporated in a rule, and courts reject 30 percent of the
rules as arbitrary and capricious because the agency did not
adequately respond to one or more of the voluminous critical
35
comments. In short, the courts converted the statutory requirement
for a “concise general statement of basis and purpose” into a judicial
requirement for a detailed and encyclopedic document that invariably
spans hundreds of pages.
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Abbott,
circuit courts began a similar process of rewriting the APA notice
requirement. APA § 553 requires an agency to issue a “[g]eneral
notice” that consists of:
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and

33. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44
(1983).
34. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4 (5th ed.
2010) (discussing cases).
35. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83–86 (2011).
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(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
36
description of the subjects and issues involved.

As was true of the requirement for a “concise general statement
of basis and purpose,” before the Court decided Abbott, agencies
complied with the modest notice requirement in APA § 553 by
publishing notices that were just a few pages long but that complied
fully with the language of the APA. That changed as courts redefined
the requirements of the APA.
In 1972, the Third Circuit issued the post-Abbott judicial opinion
that began the process of redefinition of the notice requirement
37
Congress created in the APA. The court held a notice inadequate
because it did not inform the public of all of the possible ways in
which the agency might change the rules it proposed to amend. Other
circuits soon adopted this demanding method for determining the
adequacy of a notice, and all circuits now hold that a notice is
38
inadequate if the final rule is not a “logical outgrowth” of the notice.
The practical effect of the logical-outgrowth test is to require agencies
to attempt to identify and describe in a notice every conceivable
39
version of the final rule the agency might adopt years later.
The D.C. Circuit joined in the process of redefining the notice
requirement a year later. In 1973, the D.C. Circuit rejected an agency
rule because the rule was based in part on a source of data that the
40
agency had not identified in its notice. All circuits quickly embraced
that dramatic judicial expansion of the “general notice” requirement
41
that Congress imposed in the APA. Circuits courts now hold that
“[a]n agency commits serious procedural error when it fails to reveal
portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time to allow for
42
meaningful commentary” and that the notice must provide sufficient
43
information to permit “adversarial critique.” The practical effect of
this judicially imposed duty is to require an agency to anticipate—at
the time it issues a notice—all of the sources of data and analysis that

36. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
37. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019–20 (3d Cir. 1972).
38. PIERCE, supra note 34, § 7.3.
39. Beerman & Lawson, supra note 20, at 895–99.
40. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. PIERCE, supra note 34, § 7.3.
42. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530–31 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(collecting cases).
43. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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it may want to rely on years later when it issues a final rule. The
agency also must issue a supplemental notice and provide a new
opportunity to comment if it decides to rely on a source of data or
analysis that did not become available until after it issued its initial
44
notice. That is a routine occurrence, since a major rulemaking
typically requires years to complete.
Professors Wagner, Barnes, and Peters have accurately described
the results of the dramatic judicial expansions of the modest
requirement to issue a “general notice” that Congress imposed in
APA § 553. The pre-notice part of the rulemaking process now takes
more than twice as long as the post-notice part of the process because
“the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is to survive
judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed
45
rule stage.” When the judicial expansions of the congressional
requirement of a “concise general statement of basis and purpose”
are added to the judicial expansions of the congressional requirement
of a “general notice” of proposed rulemaking, the judicial version of
APA § 553 bears no relationship to the requirements imposed by the
statute. Application of the judicial version of the APA’s requirements
to thirty-two more tax rules per year—rules issued by agencies that
already confront enormous resource constraints in their efforts to
implement the constantly expanding agenda Congress assigns them
and that already take too long to issue important rules—would have
devastating effects.
II. OIRA IS BETTER THAN COURTS AT REVIEWING RULES
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
46
reviews all economically significant rules before they go into effect.
Many scholars have described the ways in which OIRA ensures that
agencies do not overstep the boundaries of their authority and harm
the economy by engaging in regulation that imposes costs that exceed
47
their benefits, but OIRA also performs its review function in ways
that improve the quality of the rulemaking process in other ways.

44. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
45. Wendy Wagner et al., supra note 11, at 110.
46. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §
601 app. (2012).
47. E.g., Patrick A. McGlaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of
Regulatory Impact Analysis?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 183–91 (2011).
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As then-professor Justice Breyer explained twenty years ago,
OIRA has major advantages over courts in performing tasks of this
type. In his 1993 book, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective
Risk Regulation, Justice Breyer described in detail why OIRA is
48
much better suited to review agency rules than are courts. OIRA can
apply its multidisciplinary expertise and the virtues of bureaucracy to
49
rationalize the agency policymaking process.
Justice Breyer also contrasted OIRA with courts by illustrating
some of the many ways in which judicial precedents can have
unintended adverse effects. For instance, the Supreme Court’s
holding in State Farm—in which it rejected a rule because an agency
50
did not adequately consider an alternative to the rule —is likely to be
interpreted and applied to require agencies to waste time and
resources by engaging in the futile task of attempting “to establish
51
procedures to consider thoroughly all alternatives in every case.”
More recently, Professors Sally Katzen, Cass Sunstein, and
Jennifer Nou, all of whom are former OIRA officials, have described
in detail the many ways in which OIRA ensures that agency rules are
rational and based on multidisciplinary expertise. Professor Katzen, a
former OIRA administrator, has described some of her many
successful efforts to use the OIRA power to review rules as a point of
entry to allow OIRA to work with agencies to improve the rules they
52
issue. Professor Sunstein, also a former OIRA administrator, has
explained that “OIRA helps to collect widely dispersed
information—information that is held throughout the executive
53
branch and by the public as a whole.” Professor Nou, formerly a
legal policy analyst at OIRA, has used her detailed description of the
many ways in which OIRA improves the rulemaking process as part
of the basis for her well-supported argument that agencies conducting

48. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 55–72 (1993).
49. Id. at 61–67.
50. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983).
51. BREYER, supra note 48, at 58; see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 393 (1986) (noting the tension between an agency’s ability
to respond to every comment and the ability of appellate courts to address any argument raised
at the trial court level).
52. Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
103, 107–08 (2011).
53. Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013).

PIERCE IN PRINTER PROOF CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE)

14

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

10/23/2014 5:04 PM

[Vol. 64:1

rulemakings should pay more attention to the potential for OIRA
54
review than to the potential for judicial review.
As Justice Breyer, and Professors Katzen, Sunstein, and Nou
have explained in detail, the contrast between OIRA review of rules
and court review of rules is stark. OIRA applies a multidisciplinary
approach that draws on numerous sources of expertise to engage in
an intense and continuous process of communication with an agency.
Additionally, the approach is designed to identify flaws in an agency
rule and to assist the agency in identifying and implementing
beneficial changes to the rule before it is published. In most cases,
55
that review process is completed within ninety days. By contrast, a
reviewing court has no access to relevant expertise beyond its law
clerks, it engages in a review process that requires over a year to
complete, and it has extremely limited means of communicating with
an agency. If the reviewing court identifies a flaw in an agency rule, it
remands the rule. In many cases, the agency must then begin a new
56
rulemaking process that takes many more years to complete.
Moreover, as Justice Breyer has explained, the opinion in which the
court rejects the agency rule is often misunderstood by other courts
and by agencies. For instance, the Supreme Court’s famous opinion in
State Farm—in which it rejected an agency decision in a rulemaking
because the agency did not adequately consider an alternative to the
57
action it took —has been widely interpreted to require every agency
to engage in exhaustive discussion of every alternative to every action
it considers in every rulemaking, thereby adding to the high cost and
58
delay of the rulemaking process.
OIRA review is also far more likely than judicial review to
further the values of democracy. In its landmark opinion in Chevron

54. See generally Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013) (discussing the implications of presidential review for executive
agencies during the rulemaking process).
55. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1847.
56. See Nou, supra note 54, at 1756–57 (emphasizing the exhaustive nature of the agency
rulemaking process and the fact that most rules result from years of initial research).
57. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–48
(1983) (finding that the most apparent reason an agency decision was arbitrary and capricious
was that agency’s failure to provide a cogent explanation for its exercise of rulemaking
discretion).
58. See BREYER, supra note 48, at 58 (indicating that judicial decisions that require
consideration of policy alternatives can lead to the development of agency procedures that
require consideration of “all alternatives in every case”).
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U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court
held that reviewing courts must uphold any reasonable agency
interpretation of ambiguous language in an agency administered
statute. The Court explained why courts must defer to agencies in the
policy making process:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government . . . . In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
60
realities.

That reasoning also supports substitution of OIRA review of
rules for judicial review of rules. The Administrator of OIRA
invariably is someone who communicates regularly with the
President. OIRA review reflects “the incumbent administration’s
61
views of wise policy to inform its judgments.” Katzen has often
observed in her writings that the head of OIRA does what the
President requires.
Most federal agencies are mission-oriented. For instance, the
EPA’s staff is primarily dedicated to improving air and water quality.
That is an institutional characteristic that has many good effects, but
it can also have adverse effects. Agencies tend to make decisions with
tunnel vision. There are many examples of circumstances in which
Presidential involvement in a rulemaking process at the EPA has
yielded a rule that incorporates important considerations beyond
those a special purpose agency is likely to consider. A particularly
illustrative example is the EPA’s decision during the Carter
Administration to set the sulfur dioxide emissions limit at a level that
disappointed many of the environmental advocacy groups that

59. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
60. Id. at 865–66.
61. Id. at 865.
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62

comprise the EPA’s most reliable supporters. The EPA’s decision
was influenced by meetings between its administrator and the
President’s Council of Economic Advisors, the Secretary of Energy,
63
the majority leader of the Senate, and the President. Those meetings
ensured that the EPA decision incorporated consideration of factors
like the effects of the potential alternative decisions on national
security, international relations, inflation, employment, and economic
growth. D.C. Circuit Judge Wald wisely rejected environmental
groups’ claims that the meetings were inappropriate and unlawful.
She concluded instead that meetings between agency decisionmakers
and their political superiors are essential to the democratic legitimacy
64
of the agency rulemaking process.
III. COURTS CAN AND SHOULD REFUSE TO REVIEW THE
ADEQUACY OF AGENCY EXPLANATIONS FOR TAX RULES
My arguments to substitute OIRA review for judicial review of
rules apply to all rules issued by all agencies. I recognize, however,
that I am unlikely to be successful in persuading courts to stop
engaging in pre-enforcement review of most rules issued by most
agencies. That would require the Supreme Court to issue opinions
that reduce the strength of the presumption in favor of preenforcement review and overturn the many precedents in which
65
courts have dramatically expanded the requirements of APA § 553. I
hope the Supreme Court takes those actions, but it is unlikely to do so
in the near future.
Fortunately, it is easy for the courts to create the kind of legal
environment I prefer in the tax context. Courts need merely to apply
existing precedents. Tax rules have always differed from all other
66
rules because of two statutes: the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the
67
Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The AIA provides that “no suit

62. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the parties in
this case include both the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund).
63. See id. at 387–91 (discussing the extensive meetings between the EPA and the highlevel government officials following the close of the official comments period for the EPA’s
proposed regulatory change).
64. See id. at 405–08 (finding that “the authority of the President to control and supervise
executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is
demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking”).
65. See supra notes 21–44 and accompanying text.
66. The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012).
67. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
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for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such
68
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” The
purpose of the AIA is “to permit the United States to assess and
collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to
require that the legal right to the disputed sums to be determined in a
69
suit for refund.” The DJA, on the other hand, authorizes courts to
issue declaratory judgments, but it exempts from its scope suits “with
70
respect to Federal taxes.” Courts interpret the AIA and the
71
exemption in the DJA to have the same purpose and scope.
The Court attached great significance to the DJA when it
created and applied its presumption in favor of pre-enforcement
review of rules in Abbott. The Court justified its new presumption
with the assertion that the promulgation of a rule that requires
petitioners to change their behavior “puts petitioners in a dilemma
that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to
72
ameliorate.” The Court referred to the DJA again when it
announced the holding of the case:
Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and
where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in
the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached
to noncompliance, access to the courts under the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act must be
permitted, absent a statutory bar or some other unusual
73
circumstance, neither of which appears here.

Consistent with the language and reasoning in Abbott, courts
have long held that rules “with respect to Federal taxes” are not
subject to the pre-enforcement review authorized in Abbott because
the AIA and the tax exemption in the DJA qualify as “statutory bars”
to such suits. Sitting en banc, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed that
interpretation of the two acts in a 2011 opinion in which it held that
pre-enforcement review was available because the IRS rule was not a

68. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).
69. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
71. See Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 727–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (finding
that precedent interprets the AIA and the DJA as coterminous).
72. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
73. Id. at 153.
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74

rule “with respect to Federal taxes.” The court emphasized the
narrowness of its holding and the breadth of the prohibition on preenforcement review of tax rules: “in the tax context, the only APA
suits subject to review would be those cases pertaining to final agency
75
action unrelated to tax assessment and collection.”
Similarly, in its 2012 opinion in National Federation of
76
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court recognized that
the AIA bars pre-enforcement review of rules that relate to
77
“assessment or collection of any tax.” Nonetheless, the Court held
that courts could engage in pre-enforcement review of the individual
mandate in the Affordable Care Act because Congress had explicitly
characterized the only sanction available to enforce the mandate as a
78
“penalty” rather than a tax.
CONCLUSION
My goal is simple. I want to keep courts out of the process of
determining whether an IRS or Treasury explanation of a tax rule is
sufficient to comply with the APA requirement of a “concise general
statement of basis and purpose” for a tax rule and the process of
determining whether an IRS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is
adequate. Fortunately, all the courts must do to further this goal is
adhere to a long line of precedents that are based on the plain
language of two statutes.
I agree with the other participants in the 2014 Administrative
Law Symposium that the courts should “take administrative law to
tax” by holding that the IRS and Treasury must comply with the
notice-and-comment requirements of APA when they issue tax rules.
Yet I differ with the other participants by disagreeing with the view
that the courts should apply to such rules the judicial interpretations
of “notice” and “concise general statement of basis and purpose” that
have had the effect of introducing massive time and resourceconsuming inefficiencies into the rulemaking process in contexts
74. See Cohen, 650 F.3d at 730, 736 (“This suit is not about the excise tax, its assessment, or
its illegal collection. Nor is it about the money owed to taxpayers. . . . As a result, we have
federal question jurisdiction, and neither the AIA nor the DJA provide a limitation.”).
75. Id. at 733 (emphasis added).
76. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
77. See id. at 2582 (emphasis added) (finding that the AIA ordinarily allows taxes to be
challenged only after they have been collected).
78. See id. at 2584 (holding that because the penalty for failure to comply with the
individual mandate is not treated as a tax, the AIA does not apply).
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other than tax. The nation simply cannot afford to allow courts to
delay interminably the process of issuing tax rules, thereby to so
“interrupt the free flow of revenues as to jeopardize the Nation’s
fiscal stability” in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the
79
Declaratory Judgment Act.

79. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 769 (1974).

